Today the Washington Post published my commentary responding to an alarmist op-ed in the paper that played into common (and inaccurate) tropes that Taiwan is selling out its “silicon shield” at gunpoint to the United States. In reality, not only are Taiwan’s overseas fabs unable to compete with domestic production, but semiconductors have little to do with US military commitments to Taiwan, which date back to the days when Taiwan produced only sugar and two-speed bicycles.
The Post has truncated my letter for space, so I am publishing the full original text here for my subscribers:
Jim Geraghty’s panic over Taiwan is misplaced. The recently announced trade deal between the United States and East Asia’s most talked-about island nation heralds closer ties between the two countries, further integrating their supply chains, economies, and business communities, even as both sides continue to lack clarity over details of the pact’s implementation.
That Mr. Geraghty attributes much of Taiwan’s deterrent power against a Chinese invasion to the world’s dependency on TSMC’s advanced microchips is a result of years of misguided messaging by Taiwan’s government and business community. As he points out, this has led to prominent political figures, such as the likely next governor of Ohio, Vivek Ramaswamy, to call for stepping back commitments to defending Taiwan after achieving “semiconductor independence.”
In reality, the US has committed itself to maintaining Taiwan’s independence decades before Taiwanese engineers even dreamed of semiconductor fabs. Then, as now, the US recognized the importance of defending Taiwan as part of the “First Island Chain,” which contains China’s military power projection capabilities while defending our allies and homeland.
TSMC’s increased production overseas is not eroding Taiwan’s global edge, it is enhancing it, integrating Taiwan’s many suppliers up and down the value chain into the US and other allied economies, while enhancing contacts across government, business, and society. None of its overseas facilities are anywhere near being able to match Taiwan’s production of the most cutting-edge microchips, let alone compete on next-generation fabrication.
Mr. Geraghty posits instead that America’s goal should be driven by a desire to protect Taiwanese democracy. This is a noble goal, but ignores the decades of US support for the authoritarian KMT regime of Chiang Kai-shek on Taiwan, which oppressed Taiwanese desires for self-rule in their own state under their own name.
After the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, there appeared a moment for this rhetoric of global democratic solidarity, fully embraced by the Biden administration. Taiwanese political leaders repeated these adages, finding new embrace in Europe based on common democratic values.
As Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney stated bluntly in Davos this week: “we are no longer relying on just the strength of our values, but also on the value of our strength.”
2026 no longer looks like a world where such appeals to democracy or altruistic solidarity will have any cachet in the capitals of the great powers. Taiwan is fortunate that the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy articulates a clear and evergreen strategy for its defense, recognizing that the Second Island Chain, which includes the US territory of Guam, will be indefensible if the First Island Chain falls.
The “silicon shield” looks unsturdy because it never was. The sooner we abandon this false narrative, the sooner those of us who care about Taiwan’s continued freedom can make the case to the American people why we must sacrifice for that beautiful island nation.
